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COASTAL STATE TAXATION OF
OCS-PRODUCED NATURAL GAS
DAVID P. MANUEL*

INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act
in 1953,1 more than 43.9 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 5.2
billion barrels of oil have been severed from federal waters. 2 Extremely destructive oil spills and the recent accelerated search for energy resources have heightened the concern of coastal states who are
more closely examining possible environmental damage resulting
from OCS drilling activity. Many proposals have surfaced aimed at reducing the amount and extent of environmental damage, from voluntarism and taxing schemes, to involuntary regulatory compliance.
Devising a neutral policy to achieve the goal of environmental preservation becomes more complex when juxtaposed with the nation's
apparent insatiable appetite for energy. This article documents and
evaluates the attempt of one coastal state, Louisiana, to preserve its
coastline through the use of an earmarked tax levied on natural gas
entering its borders from OCS waters. 3
Plan of the paper is straightforward. First, a survey of the environmental impacts of transporting natural gas through the coastal ecosystem is presented. Then, evaluation of the first-use tax proceeds
along two lines: it is critiqued as a viable mechanism to preserve Louisiana's coastline and compared with alternate policies for minimizing
damage from natural gas transportation. Following the analysis of the
three standard mechanisms for pollution and environmental damage
control, provisions of the 1978 Louisiana first-use tax are discussed.
Critique of the tax continues with an examination of possible distributive and allocative nonneutralities associated with its imposition.
Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of possible policy implications of the Louisiana first-use tax.
*Associate Professor of Economics, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette,
Louisiana. The author wishes to thank Robert Bohm for his helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this article.
1. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953. 43 U.S.C. § § 1331-1343 (1976).
2. UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CONSERVATION DIV., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF STATISTICS, 1953-1979, at 91 (June, 1980).
3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 47:1301-1307,-1351 (West Supp. 1980).
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PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION METHODS
What then is the nature of environmental damage incurred from
natural gas produced in offshore waters? Oil and gas well explosions
resulting in petroleum slicks and culminating in hydrologic damage
are well documented. Up to 1979, such blowouts accounted for a
relatively minor amount of water pollution in the Gulf of Mexico.4
The bulk of environmental damage, however, results from pipeline
construction and energy exploration activities. Since the first-use tax
is levied on natural gas produced in OCS waters, this segment of the
paper focuses on the environmental damage resulting from the transportation of natural gas to onshore coastal facilities.'
There are three methods employed in pipeline construction: dry
land method, push-ditch or shove method, and the flotation method.
In each method, the pipeline company must purchase rights-of-way.
The dry land method necessitates that all vegetation be cleared from
the right-of-way. After clearing, a ditch is dug and welded pipe is lowered. Backfilling is necessary and the land is suitable for its previous
use, unless that use was as woodland. It is desirable to keep the rightof-way cleared of trees, brush, and undergrowth in order to prevent
possible damage to the pipe from root infiltration. Agricultural activities are generally permissible since the 6ditch depth is usually eight
feet for a standard 125 feet right-of-way.
The second method, push-ditch or shove, is suitable where the
marshland is firm, and requires approximately 150 feet for a right-ofway. First a ditch is excavated to about four to six feet in depth and
eight to ten feet wide.' Since this method is one of the two methods
employed in marsh environments, the ditch usually fills with water,
forming a shallow canal. Sections of pipe are welded at the starting
point of the canal and the entire line is given artificial buoyancy. As
each new pipe section is welded, the entire line is pushed through the
canal. 8 Once a sufficient length of pipeline has been constructed,
floats providing buoyancy are removed and the entire line sinks to
4. The famous Ixtoc I well blowout in the Bay of Campeche may reverse this observation.
S. Conversations with industry officials revealed that virtually all of the natural gas produced in the OCS waters adjacent to Louisiana's coast is transported to onshore facilities by
pipeline.
6. J. Stone, EnvironmentalImpact of a Superport in the Gulf of Mexico (paper presented
at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Chicago, 1975).
7. W. CONNER, J. STONE, L. BAHR, V. BENNETT, J. DAY & R. TURNER, OIL AND
GAS USE CHARACTERIZATION, IMPACTS, AND GUIDELINES 82 (report prepared for
the Louisiana State University Center for Wetland Resources, December 1976) [hereinafter
cited as OIL AND GAS USE].
8. Id. at 83.
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the bottom. Backfilling, even in areas of firm marsh, usually results
in substantial soil subsidence. 9 .
The last method of laying a pipeline is the most expensive and is
used when the marsh is not firm. Requiring a 300 feet right-of-way,
the flotation method utilizes a pipe-laying barge which necessitates
that a 40 to 50 feet wide canal be excavated to a depth of six to eight
feet. In addition, a trench must be dredged to provide a minimum of
ten feet clearance from the top of the pipeline.' 0
Canal dredging necessitates the disposal of spoil.' 1 Usually the
spoil is deposited on each side of the canal forming a levee 30 to 40
feet from the canal. Levees range in height from three to five feet, and
the width at the base ranges from 50 to 85 feet.1 2 High water content of the spoil leads to significant subsidence, and as much as a 50
percent reduction in levee height is not unusual.
The significant water content contributes to the additional problem
of backfilling. Rarely is there sufficient spoil to backfill the pipeline
trench or the barge canal. Hauling adequate amounts of nonmarshland soil to compensate for subsidence is probably not economical
and the environmental impacts are not presently known.' I
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE FROM PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION
Three separate effects of pipeline construction on the coastal ecosystem can be discerned: physical, chemical, and biological changes.' 4
Since pipeline construction in coastal areas is undertaken with either
the flotation or push methods, much land is lost due to canaling. Land
loss is proportional to the method used and the width and length of
the canal. A canal excavated by using the push or shove method resuits in an eight to ten feet wide ditch. Approximately one acre of
land is lost for each mile of canal excavated. 1 I On the other hand,
dredging a 40 to 50 feet wide canal to accommodate a flotation
method pipe-laying barge results in a loss of approximately six square
miles of land per mile of canal.' 16
9. J. MCGINNIS, R. EWING, C. WILLIAMSON, S. ROGERS, D. DOUGLASS & D.
MORRISON, FINAL REPORT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF GAS PIPELINE OPERATIONS IN THE LOUISIANA COASTAL MARSHES (report prepared for the BatelleColumbus Laboratories, December 1972) (hereinafter cited as PIPELINE OPERATIONS].
10. See OIL AND GAS USE, supra note 7, at 83.
11. Spoil is the excavated material which results from dredging.
12. See OIL AND GAS USE, supra note 7, at 83-86.
13. Id. at 86.
14. See PIPELINE OPERATIONS, supra note 9.

15. Id. at 3.5.
16. Id.
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Gagliano and van Beek estimate that in the 30 years prior to 1970,
Louisiana lost a total of approximately 495 square miles in land area,
an average of 16.5 square miles per year.1 7 A further estimate accounts for 45 percent (7.4 square miles) of this loss to human-induced
forces which, of course, include more activities than just natural gas
pipelining.' 8 McGinnis estimates that approximately six percent, or
one square mile, of annual Louisiana land loss is due to natural gas
pipelining.' I Additional marshland acreage is lost or altered in the
dispersion of spoil and the siting of gas compressor and reprocessing
stations.
Due to the common practice of bulkheading, 2 I pipeline canal erosion is not a significant factor in total coastline erosion. Storms and
tidal changes apparently account for the major portion of Louisiana's
coastal erosion. Spoils from the canal dredging present some physical
damage since drainage patterns are altered and the character of the
surrounding marsh is changed. 2 Finally, changes in turbidity are
also associated with canal dredging and spoil dispersion.
Besides the physical damage to the coastal environment, pipeline
dredging inflicts various degrees of chemical damage. After dredging,
displaced soils have low pH values and high concentrations of toxic
hydrogen sulfide. This explains the slow revegetation of levees after
dredging operations are complete. 2
Water salinity is extremely important in the marsh ecosystem because of the estuary's role as a nursery for shrimp, fur animals, and
oysters. Much of the rate of change in coastal estuarine salinity is
seasonal due to rainfall and drainage from the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers. 3 Unfortunately, no firm impact studies on marshland
salinity changes from pipeline construction have been undertaken.
17. 1 HYDROLOGIC AND GEOLOGIC STUDIES OF COASTAL LOUISIANA: S.
GAGLIANO & J. VAN BEEK, GEOLOGIC AND GEOMORPHIC ASPECTS OF DELTAIC
PROCESSES, MISSISSIPPI DELTA SYSTEMS (prepared for the Louisiana State University

Coastal Studies Institute and the Department of Marine Sciences, 1970).
18. 3 HYDROLOGIC AND GEOLOGIC STUDIES OF COASTAL LOUISIANA: S.
GAGLIANO, P. LIGHT & R. BECKER, CONTROLLED DIVERSION IN THE MISSISSIPPI
DELTA SYSTEMS: AN APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (prepared
for the Louisiana State University Coastal Studies Institute and the Department of Marine
Sciences, 1971).
19. See PIPELINE OPERATIONS, supra note 9, at 3.4-3.5.
20. Bulkheading is the practice of constructing a retaining wall at the point at which a
pipeline canal opens to a body of water.
21. PIPELINE OPERATIONS, supra note 9, at 3.10.
22. Id. at 3.11.
23. 2 HYDROLOGIC AND GEOLOGIC STUDIES OF COASTAL LOUISIANA: S.
GAGLIANO, H. KWON & J. VAN BEEK, SALINITY REGIMES IN LOUISIANA ESTUARIES (prepared for the Louisiana State University Coastal Studies Institute and the Department of Marine Sciences, 1970).
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Dredging pipeline canals with no thought to the possible current and
tidal flows into the marsh would certainly contribute to increased
salt water intrusion.
Vegetation may be lost in pipeline construction from the actual
ditch dredging, erosion of the canal after the pipeline is completed,
compaction under the weight of equipment, or burial beneath the
levee.2 I Canaling increases the frequency of tidal flooding of brackish marsh, thereby raising the salinity and often resulting in the destruction of native vegetation. These effects change plant specie composition, further disrupting the food chain and, in turn, the marsh
ecosystem.
Very little is known about the effects of gas pipelining on animal
populations and behavior. Dredging and the resulting land loss decrease habitable areas for some species of animals indigenous to the
marsh. But for other species, for example muskrat, nutria, and certain reptiles, canals may represent an increase in habitable areas. It
should be recognized that habitat is dependent upon an adequate
food supply. Spoil disposal, land loss, and chemical changes due to
pipelining may offset the possible positive effects of increasing habitats for selected species due to canaling.
Little conclusive evidence is available on the effects of gas pipelining on bird populations. Broad generalizations, however, point to
the nature of the problem. Chemical changes in the marsh ecosystem,
such as lower pH levels and high salinity concentrations, disrupt the
bird food chain. Ultimately, nesting patterns and the success of nesting may suffer. Food supply may also be reduced or eliminated if
channelization increases water depth and if habitat is continually destroyed through spoil dispersion.
Finally, and of great concern to commercial fishermen, is the effect
of dredging and natural gas pipelining on shrimp and oyster populations. Dredging and canaling result in the suspension of many heavy
metals, sulfides, and various bacteria, high concentrations of which
have been found in oysters and other mollusks.2 I Release of gases,
increased siltation, higher salinity levels, and increased turbidity are
additional effects that can detrimentally affect shrimp and oysters in
the marsh estuaries. Conclusive evidence of the ultimate effects of
these changes on seafood productivity is limited, and there is a distinct need for field programs to obtain more specific data.2 6

24. See PIPELINE OPERATIONS, supra note 9, at 3.6.
25. Id. at 3.22.

26. Id. at 3.21-3.27.
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POLICY OPTIONS TO CONTROL EXTERNALITIES
Direct quantity controls have been used in the United States because of the visibility of their results, as in auto emission standards
and nuclear power plant steam ejections. Setting standards for environmental damage inflicted on marsh environments by pipeline activities, however, would appear to be extremely difficult, due to the
complexity of the marsh ecosystem.
Fairly accurate estimates of land loss due to pipeline construction
could be attained through on-site inspection during and after construction. A zero land loss standard is in the state's interest. Given
the high water content of marshland, however, such a goal may not
be feasible. That is, mandatory backfilling would necessitate the importation of nonmarsh soil. While this could possibly reduce land loss
and subsidence, thereby contributing to the effectiveness of the quantity control, the impact of introducing such nonmarsh soil into the
marsh ecosystem is not known and adds an additional dimension.
Furthermore, quantity controls would have to be applied to other
environmental damages incurred. Revegetation, chemical, and turbidity standards would first have to be established followed by extensive biological testing to determine critical levels that the marsh ecosystem can accommodate. Coupled with enforcement and information
costs, control cost would tend to be prohibitive.2 "
Of marginal significance would be the imposition of subsidies to
stimulate corrective action. Positive effects of subsidies are their contribution to equity and minimization of high control costs incurred
in setting standards. However, it is far from proven that subsidies result in full compliance. 2" Furthermore, knowledge by the pipeline
company or offshore gas producer that government will share in the
cost of marsh reclamation and minimization of chemical and biological damage may not induce the firm to use other methods of pipelaying, particularly the placing of pipelines in existing channels and
2
canals. 9

In addition to standards and subsidies, one must also consider the
feasibility of damage charges or taxation. Griffin suggests that effluent charges work reasonably well in reducing pollution.'I The two
advantages of the tax which appear most significant are the minimi27. Griffin, Environmental Quality and Rising Energy Needs: a Collision Course? in
STUDIES IN ENERGY TAX POLICY 253 (G. Brannon ed. 1975).

28. Id. at 278.
29. Peterson and Galper, Tax Exempt Financingof Private Industry's Pollution Control
Investment, 23 PUB. POL'Y. 81 (1975).
30. See Griffin, supra note 27, at 280.

January 198 11

COASTAL STATE TAXATION

zation of information and control costs, and the stimulant to install
pollution abatement equipment.
Unlike control standards, a given percentage reduction in environmental damage is difficult to achieve with a tax. However, if pollution
abatement costs are less than the damage tax, each firm should be induced to install such equipment rather than pay the tax on its emissions.3 1 A heavy tax placed on the amount of subsidence after using
the excavated spoil as backfill might induce pipeline companies to
import nonmarsh soil. Such a tax would have to be extremely high to
offer sufficient inducement for such abatement, for the cost of transporting foreign backfill material would almost surely be great. Furthermore, a "Catch-22" paradox may then surface. As pointed out earlier,
introducing foreign backfill into the marsh environment may also result in damage to the ecosystem.
Since much of the chemical and biological damage incurred in the
marsh environment results from pipeline dredging activities, it may
not be feasible to levy a tax on pH changes, increases in turbidity,
salinity changes, or vegetation losses. That is, the latter are the effects
of the damage, not the cause. In addition, information and control
costs would be enormous in order to acquire adequate compliance
data.
THE LOUISIANA FIRST-USE TAX: PROVISIONS AND EVALUATION
Signed into law by Louisiana Governor Edwin W. Edwards on July
18, 1978, the Louisiana first-use tax is indeed an innovative measure. 3 2 The need for such a tax points to the dilemma with which
most coastal states are confronted. Offshore energy activities are a
proven source of employment and stimulation to coastal industrialization; however, present and future general welfare of the population
entails more than economic welfare. Paramount to a high quality of
life is the prevention of natural resource squandering and the preservation of coastal ecosystems.
In its statement of policy on the establishment of the first-use tax,
the Louisiana legislature recognized three important guidelines. First,
current severance taxes on oil and natural gas produced within the
state's boundaries do not prevent the economic waste of Louisiana's
energy resources.3 Furthermore, the legislature expressed a concern
31. Wenders, Corrective Taxes and Pollution Abatement, 16 J. OF LAW & ECON. 365
(1973).
32. The first use tax became effective on April 1, 1979.
33. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1301(A) (West Supp. 1980).
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for equity when it stated that taxing in-state producers for the environmental damage done by natural gas pipelines carrying offshoreproduced gas may unduly discriminate against in-state producers.3 4
Second, the coastal state's natural resources extend beyond its geographical land borders. Of extreme importance are the water-bottoms,
barrier islands, and marshlands that are temporarily inundated by
tidal currents. These areas form vital links in the ecosystem, create
the habitat for a myriad of aquatic life and wildlife, protect the coastline from erosion, and are of commercial, recreational, and aesthetic
value. 3 I The Louisiana legislature obviously felt that the state should
be compensated for environmental damage to these coastal resources
from the introduction of natural gas from offshore waters.
Lastly, the legislature expressed concern over an equitable share of
the burden of environmental coastline preservation. It was indeed
common in past years to disburse public funds for the protection of
the state's shoreline and barrier islands.3 6 However, benefits of publicly funded coastal improvements do not accrue solely to the producers of natural gas from offshore tracts, as Act 294 suggests. Offshore producers of natural gas bear a part of the burden to protect
the coastal environment through property taxes imposed on pipeline
companies, through corporate income taxes, and through other indirect means. Imposition of a tax on the parties responsible for most
of the coastal ecosystem damage would, therefore, seem to shift
much of the burden presently imposed on state residents.
Act 294 imposes a tax of $.07 on each 1000 cubic feet of natural
gas that is first used in the state of Louisiana, provided that gas has
not been already taxed by the state. "Use" is defined as
the sale; the transportation in the state to the point of delivery at
the inlet of any processing plant; the transportation in the state of
unprocessed natural gas to the point of delivery at the inlet of any
measurement or storage facility; transfer of possession or relinquishment of control at a delivery point in the state; processing for the
extraction of liquefiable component products or waste materials; use
in manufacturing;
treatment; or other ascertainable action at a point
3
within the state. 7
Exclusions from the tax include natural gas on which a severance tax
is levied, gas used in the extraction of mineral resources, natural gas
shrinkage volumes attributed to the extraction of ethane, propane,
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 47:1301(C)
§ 47:1301(B)
§ 47:1301(C)
§ 47:1302(8)

(West Supp.
(West Supp.
(West Supp.
(West Supp.

1980).
1980).
1980).
1980).
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butane, and other hydrocarbon liquids, and natural gas used in the
manufacture of fertilizer and anhydrous ammonia.3
After the creation of a permanent Initial Proceeds Account in the
sum of $500 million, proceeds from the Louisiana first-use tax are
earmarked for two trust fund accounts. Seventy-five percent of the
tax revenues are deposited in the Debt Retirement and Redemption
Account. The legislature determined that these monies would be
used to "purchase, in advance of maturity, on the open market any
outstanding obligations of the state, or to call, pay, or redeem in advance of maturity any outstanding bonds, notes, or other evidences
of state debt."'3 9 Such purchases or redemptions would only be made
if they resulted in interest savings to the state. The remaining 25 percent of the monies are deposited in the Barrier Islands Conservation
Account and are earmarked for capital improvement projects designed to conserve, preserve, and maintain the barrier islands, reefs,
and shores of the state.4 0
The 1978 Louisiana first-use tax does not appear to fit the description of a damage tax as outlined above. However, the purpose of the
legislature was apparently to establish a relatively firm relationship
between the first-use tax receipts and the decision as to how to disburse the revenues. It is common in such examples of functionaldecisional earmarking to deposit tax receipts in trust funds.' I
The crisis over adequate energy supplies, and increased scrutiny of
public spending projects, have apparently slowed the drive toward
public spending on improved environmental quality. Specific environmental improvement projects still require legislative approval under
Act 294. However, not having to compare an environmental project
to other projects requiring general revenues would relieve the decisionmakers of some public pressure that may otherwise exist. Furthermore, compensation from an activity such as pipeline construction
may ease public
resistance to an activity that would destroy valuable
4
marshlands. 2
The rationale for depositing 75 cents of the receipts in a debt retirement account appears to have been concern for equity and for
shifting the burden of correcting past environmental destruction.
However, current state debt was not entirely incurred by capital im38. Id. § 47:1303(A) (West Supp. 1980).
39. Id. § 47:1351(A)(2)(b) (West Supp. 1980).
40. Id. § 47:1351(A)(3) (West Supp. 1980).
41. Brannon, Earmarked Revenues to Finance Energy-Related Objectives, in STUDIES
IN ENERGY TAX POLICY, supra note 27, at 273; Buchanan, The Economics of Earmarked
Taxes, 74 J. OF POL. ECON. 457 (1963).
42. See Brannon, supra note 41, at 390; Griffin, supra note 27.
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provement projects designed to prevent or correct past environmental
damage. Therefore, the Louisiana legislature obviously viewed a tax
on OCS-produced natural gas as a vehicle for revenue generation, and
by earmarking the tax to debt retirement, eased some of the public's
reluctance to the establishment of yet another tax. The revenuegenerating goal of the legislature becomes vivid when one considers
the recent record of state severance tax revenues to total revenues. In
the period April 1, 1979 through August 30, 1980, first-use tax collections totaled $402.5 million whereas state severance taxes were
$742.6 million. The latter represented 24.2 percent of total state revenue in that period, yet in fiscal year 1974-75,
severance taxes repre43
sented 42.0 percent of total state receipts.
As a user tax, the first-use tax can be evaluated on the grounds of
possible distributive and allocative nonneutralities. Both will depend
heavily on the price elasticity of the demand for natural gas, crosselasticities of natural gas with other fuels, the time period allowed
for adjustment to a price change, and the availability of substitutes.
Most of the natural gas produced in the OCS waters is dedicated to
interstate gas markets. Because of this market, non-Louisiana consumers of natural gas would bear a disproportionate share of the burden of the first-use tax in the short run. 4 4 Residential demand for
natural gas in the short run appears to be relatively inelastic, thus
facilitating the supplier's ability to shift the tax forward to the consumer. 41 Such a pass-through will be more difficult in the long run,
since the price elasticities for natural gas are likely to increase, and the
residential consumer may have an added stimulus to switch to other
fuels, provided adequate substitutes exist. One possible substitute
might be natural gas produced within the continental United States,
given that such supplies could be discovered and developed.
Ability of the residential consumer to substitute coal or petroleum
for natural gas in the long run will be further influenced by consumer
income. Lower income non-Louisiana consumers of natural gas will
probably pay a higher percentage of their income in the first-use tax
than high income non-Louisiana consumers. In addition, the higher
income natural gas consumer has a greater capability of financing the
43. Scott & Richardson, Louisiana's Oil and Gas Severance Tax: an Historical Review,
42 LA. BUS. REV. 2, 5 (July 1978).
44. Culbertson, Economic Analysis of the Proposed Use-Tax on Natural Gas from Offshore Areas, 41 LA. BUS. REV. 2, 12 (Feb. 1977).
45. Current Federal Energy Regulatory Commission policy allows such a pass-through
by interstate natural gas companies. See U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 14 ENERGY POLICY STUDY: ENERGY TAXATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED TAXES 52 (prepared by the Committee on Energy Taxation,
Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences, National Research Council, Washington, September 1980).
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investment necessary to substitute other fuels. The regressive nature
of the tax is thus aggravated.
Difficulty arises in trying to determine the effect of the first-use
tax on industrial demand for natural gas. Wide variations in the ownprice elasticity estimates in the industrial sectors are reported in Pindyck, and much of this is probably due to the individual industry uses
of natural gas.' 6 Some industries may be extremely sensitive to
natural gas price changes, while others are unable to substitute coal
and petroleum for their energy needs depending on the nature of the
goods they produce and their ability to acquire suitable substitutes.
Electricity generation demonstrates a considerable ability to substitute fuels, but the industry generally utilizes that fuel which is relatively least expensive. 4 7
Determining how much of the first-use tax will be shifted to the
final end-use customer is clouded by the prospect of price deregulation. Since the tax is placed on the volume of natural gas, it will represent a smaller proportion of the cost of fuel outlay as natural gas
prices increase. If the prices of coal and petroleum rise more than
proportionately when compared to natural gas prices, substitution of
the former fuels may not occur, regardless of relatively high cross
elasticities and the availability of alternatives to OCS-produced gas.
On the other hand, a long run condition of high own-price elasticity for natural gas, high cross elasticities with substitutes, and a high
price of natural gas relative to other fuels, may result in a backward
shifting of the first-use tax. Such an occurrence may result in three
related effects. First, marginal natural gas wells in the OCS waters
may be shut-in, resulting in a reverse multiplicative effect on the
coastal economy. The adverse economic effects of such industry behavior would almost surely be localized. Second, producers may lower
bids and royalty payment offerings on future OCS lease sales.4 8
Effects of the latter long run behavior by producers would be more
diffused, but would generally reduce federal revenues and would require some counter action by the federal government. A third long
run effect may be the exporting of natural gas transmission capital
(pipelines) from the Louisiana offshore regions to the coastal areas of
neighboring states. This last scenario is similar to that hypothesized
by McLure in response to a Texas refining tax.4 9
46. Pindyck, The Characteristicsof the Demand for Energy, in ENERGY: CONSERVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 38, 39 (J. Sawhill ed. 1979).
47. Id.; Griffin, Inter-Fuel Substitution Possibilities: A Translog Application to Intercountry Data, 18 INT'L. ECON. REV. 755 (1977).
48. See Culbertson, supra note 44, at 13.
49. McLure, Economic Constraintson State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources,
31 NAT. TAX J. 257 (1978); The Economic Effects of a Texas Tax on the Refining of
Petroleum Products, 11 GROWTH & CHANGE 2 (July 1980).
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A final effect of the first-use tax is its contribution to a long run
redistribution of aggregate income. Miernyk hypothesizes that due to
rising energy prices, the traditional energy producing states will realize
a windfall in personal income, wages, rents, and taxes.' 0 Since the
Louisiana severance tax on petroleum is an ad valorem tax based on
the value of the resource, higher petroleum prices will provide a tax
windfall to Louisiana at the expense of those states which are net
consumers of petroleum. The first-use tax of $.07 per 1000 cubic feet
of natural gas is the same as the state's severance tax on in-state produced gas. Given that non-Louisiana residents bear a bulk of the burden of paying the first-use tax in the short run, Louisiana will receive
an additional windfall in tax revenues, and an aggregate redistribution
of income will have occurred.
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Damage inflicted on the marsh environment from pipelines is obviously extensive. Other than the implications for land loss, measurement of ecosystem changes is inconclusive. There is, however, a dire
need for extensive field investigations to at least begin an inventory
of data to which future marsh ecosystem changes can be analyzed
and compared.
High information and control costs associated with damage taxes,
quantity controls, and subsidies would appear to negate the advisability of such control mechanisms. Complexity of the marsh ecosystem,
therefore, necessitates the employment of a user tax on natural gas
with the revenues of the tax earmarked for environmental improvement projects. A major flaw in the Louisiana first-use tax lies in its
inability to prevent future environmental damage from pipeline construction and other energy related activities in the coastal ecosystem.
One rather severe drawback of the first-use tax is that the tax is
placed on a restrictive group. Natural gas producers in OCS waters
and interstate natural gas pipeline companies are not the only parties
inflicting damage on the coastal environment. Producers of oil and
gas in the marsh and oil pipeline companies inflict similar, if not identical, damage. These parties are not subject to the first-use tax, while
severance and property taxes paid by in-state producers of petroleum
and natural gas are not earmarked for coastal preservation. Therefore,
Louisiana would appear to be discriminating against OCS producers
50. W. MIERNYK, F. GIARRATANI & C. SOCHER, REGIONAL IMPACTS OF RISING
ENERGY PRICES (1978); Miernyk, Regional Consequences of High Energy Prices in the
United States, 1 J. OF ENERGY & DEV. 213 (1976); Regional Employment Impacts of
Rising Energy Prices, 26 LAB. LAW J. 518 (1975); RisingEnergy Prices and Regional Economic Development, 8 GROWTH & CHANGE 2 (July 1977).
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for environmental damage done by a much broader group of producers and pipeline companies."t
Revenue potential for the first-use tax appears to be excellent. The
possibility of earmarking such increased revenues to environmental
goals, as well as to state debt retirement, may offset northeastern
states' reluctance to allow OCS exploration and production activities.
Enactment of a similar energy tax by such states will of course depend
on the outcome
of current court tests regarding the legality of the
5
first-use tax. 2
The nature of the short run elasticity for natural gas contributes to
the regressive nature of the first-use tax. It is unlikely that residential
users of the fuel will be able to substitute alternative fuels; however,
depending upon the industrial uses of natural gas and the long run
deregulated price, industrial substitutions to alternate energy sources
may be accelerated due to the first-use tax. Therefore, in the long
run, the first-use tax will probably be shifted backward to the suppliers and producers of OCS natural gas.

51. Since the original lawsuit was brought before the United States Supreme Court,
eight additional states and seventeen pipeline companies have joined Maryland as plaintiffs
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has filed an amicus curiae brief. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 99 S. Ct. 2876 (1979).
52. Id.

